A practical bridge from New York to New Jersey family law
For attorneys and paralegals who already know New York matrimonial practice and need to get oriented in New Jersey fast — what's the same, what's different, and where to go for the rule itself.
This is an internal orientation reference, not a substitute for the statutes, court rules, and case law it summarizes. New Jersey family law — especially custody law — has changed significantly as recently as January 2026, so always confirm currency against the linked primary sources, and run case-specific questions by a supervising NJ-admitted attorney.
Start here: foundational courses & reading
Take these in order before picking up case work. Each one builds vocabulary or context the rest of this guide assumes.
Welcome to the Profession: Intro to Family Law Practice
Gives you the basic NJ procedural vocabulary — Family Part structure, FM/FD/FV docket types, the Case Information Statement, the Early Settlement Panel — that everything else in this guide refers to.
njsba.com — Intro to Family Law PracticeNavigating Domestic Violence Cases in 2026 (replay)
New Jersey's Prevention of Domestic Violence Act and the FRO process run on a completely different timeline than a New York family offense proceeding — DV matters move in days, not weeks.
njsba.com — DV Cases in 2026 (replay)What the New Child Custody Bill Means for Your Practice
Covers the January 20, 2026 amendments to N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 (S4510/P.L. 2025, c.316) — reunification therapy limits, parental-alienation presumptions, licensed-professional requirements. Very recent law that older treatises won't reflect (see Section 6).
njsba.com — New Child Custody BillFamily Law Boot Camp
The "how it actually runs" course — motion practice conventions, case management orders, and Early Settlement Panel prep.
njsba.com — Family Law Boot CampOpening a case & initial financial disclosure
The first papers, and the first financial disclosures, look different enough that NY instincts can lead you astray here.
Commencing the action
A divorce action is commenced by filing either a Summons with Notice or a Summons and Verified Complaint (CPLR 304; DRL §§210, 232).
A Summons with Notice is a lighter opening paper — it states the grounds and relief sought in general terms. The full Verified Complaint can be drafted and served later if the defendant demands it.
This lets a filer "hold a place" — preserve the filing date and trigger the automatic orders — while final positions are still being worked out.
There is no NJ equivalent of "summons with notice." Every dissolution action begins with a Verified Complaint for Divorce, and the court issues a Summons under R. 5:4-5 directing the defendant to file an Answer.
The Complaint itself must already state the ground(s) relied on (R. 5:4-2) — that can't be deferred to a later pleading the way it can in NY.
Translation: where a NY reflex might be to file a quick Summons with Notice to get something on file, in NJ the Complaint has to be substantively complete — grounds and basic relief — from day one.
Financial & insurance disclosure
Each party files a sworn Statement of Net Worth with attachments (tax returns, pay stubs, W-2s).
Separately, the Automatic Orders served with the Summons (DRL §236) independently require both parties to maintain existing health, life, and auto insurance during the litigation — a standing order, not part of the Net Worth Statement itself.
Retainer Statements and Temporary Maintenance Guidelines worksheets are typically their own separate filings, often due about 10 days before a Preliminary Conference.
The Case Information Statement (CIS — Appendix V, R. 5:5-2) is the single consolidated financial disclosure. It's filed by both parties within 20 days of an Answer/Appearance in any contested case touching custody, support, alimony, or equitable distribution — and it has its own built-in insurance section as part of the full financial picture.
But that's not the first insurance disclosure. The very first pleading of each party must already have its own insurance affidavit annexed — see the filing packet below. The CIS revisits insurance later; it doesn't replace that initial filing.
Translation: NY's Net Worth Statement + retainer statement roughly map to NJ's CIS — but don't let the CIS's insurance section lull you into thinking that's NJ's only insurance disclosure. There's an earlier one, due with the Complaint itself.
The filing packet — what travels with the Complaint in NJ
In NY, the opening filing is comparatively light: a Summons (with Notice, or with a Verified Complaint) plus the Automatic Orders. In NJ, R. 5:4-2 requires the Complaint to travel with a small packet of additional sworn documents — none of which have a direct NY counterpart. Missing one can generate a deficiency notice, and for the CLIS specifically, dismissal of the pleading if not cured within 10 days.
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R. 5:4-2(c)
Affidavit/Certification of Verification & Non-Collusion — annexed to every Complaint or Counterclaim for divorce, civil union dissolution, or nullity. A sworn statement that the pleading's allegations are true and that it's filed in good faith, without collusion.
NY equivalent: none specifically — a NY Verified Complaint covers truthfulness, but there's no separate non-collusion oath. -
R. 5:4-2(f)
Affidavit/Certification of Insurance Coverage — the first pleading of each party must list all known insurance covering the parties and their minor children: life, health, auto, homeowner's/renter's, umbrella, long-term care, and disability. It must state whether any coverage was canceled or modified in the preceding 90 days, and the rule requires that the listed coverage be maintained pending further court order.
NY equivalent: closest analog is the Automatic Orders (DRL §236) restraining changes to insurance — but those are a standing court order, not a sworn inventory each party files. -
Confidential Litigant Information Sheet
CLIS (CN 10486, R. 5:4-2(g)) — a confidential form capturing each party's date/place of birth, SSN, driver's license number, and similar identifiers, used by the Probation Division if a support order later needs enforcement. Not served on the other party. Plaintiff files it with the Complaint; defendant files it with the Answer. Required in every FM and FD case (clarified by a November 8, 2024 Notice to the Bar).
NY equivalent: none — there's no comparable confidential-identifier form filed at the outset of a NY matrimonial action. -
R. 5:4-2(h)
CDR (Complementary Dispute Resolution) Certification — for represented parties, a "Certification by Attorney and Client" (Appendix XXVII-A) confirming the attorney gave the client the court's descriptive material on mediation/arbitration alternatives to litigation and discussed it. Self-represented litigants file their own version (CN 10889).
NY equivalent: none filed with the Summons — no comparable mandatory ADR-notice certification at commencement.
Grounds for divorce
Both states have fault and no-fault grounds, but the lists don't map one-to-one, and the no-fault grounds work differently.
- (1) Cruel and inhuman treatment
- (2) Abandonment, 1+ year
- (3) Imprisonment, 3+ consecutive years during the marriage
- (4) Adultery
- (5) Living apart pursuant to a decree/judgment of separation, 1+ year
- (6) Living apart pursuant to a written separation agreement, 1+ year
- (7) Irretrievable breakdown, 6+ months ("no-fault") — but no judgment may enter until every economic and custody/parenting-time issue is resolved by agreement or court order
- (a) Adultery
- (b) Willful & continued desertion, 12+ months
- (c) Extreme cruelty (3-month statutory wait from the last act)
- (d) Separation — different habitations, 18+ consecutive months
- (e) Addiction / habitual drunkenness, 12+ months
- (f) Institutionalization for mental illness, 24+ months
- (g) Imprisonment, 18+ consecutive months
- (h) Deviant sexual conduct without consent
- (i) Irreconcilable differences, 6+ months, no reasonable prospect of reconciliation — added 2007, the overwhelmingly most-used ground
Also note: NJ has nothing directly analogous to NY's "conversion divorce" grounds (§170(5)/(6) — living apart under a prior decree or written agreement). The closest NJ equivalent, the 18-month separation ground (d), is rarely used now that the 6-month irreconcilable-differences ground exists.
The procedural pathway after filing
NJ's path from filing to settlement has two structured steps — the Early Settlement Panel and mandatory economic mediation — that simply don't exist in NY matrimonial practice.
Held within 45 days of filing the RJI (22 NYCRR §§202.12, 202.16).
Sets the discovery schedule and case track; matrimonial cases get a 6-month target disposition window from the RJI.
Many parts require fully executed Net Worth Statements, retainer statements, and Temporary Maintenance Guidelines worksheets filed roughly 10 days before the conference.
Held within 30 days of the last responsive pleading for priority/complex-track cases (R. 5:1, R. 5:5-7). Any contested custody or parenting-time issue automatically puts the case on the priority track.
Produces a Case Management Order — sets the discovery end date and, critically, schedules the ESP date.
Many vicinages let the CMO be entered on consent without an appearance if the parties agree on its terms.
- ESP covers only the economic issues — equitable distribution, alimony, college contribution, counsel fees. It does not touch custody or parenting time.
- 2–3 volunteer matrimonial attorneys (5+ years' experience) review both sides' submissions and give a non-binding recommendation.
- If both parties accept, the settlement goes on the record that day. If not, the case proceeds straight to mandatory post-ESP mediation (below).
What goes in the ESP submission ("case profile")
Due to the ESP coordinator (and panelists, if known) at least 5 days before the panel date. Missing it can mean counsel-fee assessments or dismissal of pleadings. It should include:
- An updated CIS (Appendix V) with all required attachments — tax returns, W-2s/1099s, recent pay stubs, statements for every listed asset and debt
- An ESP statement/memo — a short narrative of the case posture, then an issue-by-issue statement of that party's settlement position on every economic item: proposed distribution of each asset/debt, alimony amount and duration position, college contribution position, counsel-fee request, etc.
- Any prior orders, agreements, appraisals, or valuations bearing on equitable distribution
Translation: build ESP and post-ESP mediation into every NJ case timeline starting at the CMC — NY has nothing structurally equivalent to "show up, get a same-day non-binding recommendation on every financial issue, and if it doesn't settle, pick a mediator before you go."
Equitable distribution: separate property
Both states exempt premarital property and individually-received gifts/inheritances — NJ via N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(h), NY via DRL §236B(1)(c). But each state's courts ask a different question when that separate property gets mixed into the marriage.
Painter v. Painter, 65 N.J. 196 (1974) is the foundational case: marital property runs from the date of marriage through the date the Complaint is filed, and separate property keeps its exempt status only as long as it stays separate.
The recurring litigation question is tracing: can the party claiming the exemption document, with records, that the asset (or its proceeds) is still identifiable and segregable from marital funds? If inherited money goes into a joint account and gets mixed with marital income to the point it can't be traced, it becomes part of the marital pot — not because of any intent analysis, but because it's no longer identifiable as separate.
Active appreciation of separate property during the marriage (e.g., marital funds paying down the mortgage on a premarital home) can itself become a distributable asset even while the underlying property stays separate.
DRL §236B(1)(c) creates a presumption that property acquired during the marriage is marital, rebuttable by clear and convincing evidence.
NY courts additionally apply transmutation: separate property can convert to marital property based on the parties' conduct and apparent intent — most commonly where separate property is retitled into joint names during the marriage (raising a presumption of an inter-spousal gift to the marriage), or where marital funds or efforts substantially improve a separate asset.
This gives NY courts somewhat broader discretion to find that separate property became marital based on how the parties titled and treated the asset — even where, unlike the NJ tracing inquiry, the funds might still be traceable on paper.
Custody & domestic violence — including the January 2026 law
This is the area that has moved fastest. NJ now has statutory guardrails around reunification therapy and parental-alienation arguments that NY simply doesn't have.
NJ's existing framework
N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 lists the best-interests factors courts must consider, including "the history of domestic violence, if any" and "the safety of the child and the safety of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent." This is one factor in a multi-factor test — not, on its own, an automatic bar.
Separately, N.J.S.A. 9:2-4.1 (since 1995) provides a narrow, existing presumption: a parent convicted of sexual assault, criminal sexual contact, aggravated criminal sexual contact, or endangering the welfare of a child shall not be awarded custody or visitation unless that parent shows by clear and convincing evidence that it's nonetheless in the child's best interest. This is tied to actual convictions — not to FRO findings or DV allegations generally.
- Makes child safety a threshold consideration in custody determinations.
- Courts may not presume that a child's reluctance to see a parent was caused by the other parent — i.e., no presumption of "parental alienation."
- A parent with a documented history of abuse cannot be awarded increased custodial time on the rationale of "improving" that parent-child relationship.
- Reunification therapy can essentially no longer be ordered without both parents' consent, a finding the child is of sufficient age/maturity, and generally-accepted scientific evidence the program is safe and effective; any ordered therapy must be monitored so it isn't coercive or punitive.
- Mental health professionals in custody matters must be NJ-licensed; in abuse/DV-involved cases, they must also have specialized training.
- A child's reasoned preference (when of sufficient age/maturity) must be considered, with on-the-record reasons if the court orders something different; in-camera interviews are permitted.
DRL §240(1)(a) requires courts to consider domestic violence as part of the best-interests analysis (Eschbach v. Eschbach and its progeny), but NY has no statutory presumption — rebuttable or otherwise — against awarding custody to a parent with a DV history, comparable to NJ's §9:2-4.1.
NY likewise has not enacted Kayden's-Law-style statutory restrictions on court-ordered reunification therapy or parental-alienation presumptions comparable to NJ's January 2026 amendments. NY's framework remains a more purely case-law-driven "totality of the circumstances" best-interests inquiry.
Where a NY practitioner is used to arguing DV history as "one factor among many, through case law," NJ now has specific statutory guardrails (as of Jan. 2026) around reunification therapy, alienation presumptions, and evaluator qualifications that directly constrain what relief is even available to request — these aren't just persuasive factors, they're threshold requirements.
Court structure: "one family, one judge"
NJ's Family Part is built around continuity across a family's matters. NY's structure can split related matters between different judicial officers — especially in Family Court.
The Family Part operates on a "one family, one judge" assignment philosophy — the same judge generally handles all aspects of a family's litigation: the dissolution (FM docket), post-judgment motions, custody and support modifications, and often a related domestic violence (FV) matter.
Case tracks are assigned under R. 5:1 — a contested custody or parenting-time issue automatically puts a case on the priority track.
Docket shorthand worth knowing: FM = dissolution (divorce), FD = non-dissolution custody/support, FV = domestic violence/restraining orders.
Within a Supreme Court divorce action (the Individual Assignment System), one Justice is generally assigned and handles custody, support, and equitable distribution together within that case — this part is actually similar to NJ.
The bigger divergence is in Family Court (non-divorce proceedings), where different proceeding types are routed to different judicial officers:
- Support/paternity petitions (FCA Article 4) are heard by a Support Magistrate, not a judge; objections go to a Family Court Judge for review.
- Custody/visitation petitions (FCA Article 6) and orders of protection are heard by a Family Court Judge or Court Attorney Referee (referees generally need party consent to issue a final, appealable order).
Alimony / spousal support
NY runs on a statutory formula. NJ explicitly does not — and the Appellate Division keeps saying so.
DRL §236B(5-a) (temporary/pendente lite) and §236B(6) (post-divorce) both run on statutory formulas.
General approach: take the lower of (a) 30% of the payor's income minus 20% of the payee's income, or (b) 40% of combined income minus the payee's income (the exact inputs shift slightly depending on whether the payor also pays child support).
The formula applies up to a statutory income cap (adjusted periodically for CPI — roughly $184,000 in recent years); above the cap, the court has discretion guided by the §236B(6) factors.
Post-divorce duration follows an advisory schedule tied to marriage length (roughly 15–30% of the marriage for up to 15 years, 30–40% for 15–20 years, 35–50% for 20+ years), with deviation allowed on stated reasons.
N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(b) lists 14 factors the court "shall consider" — actual need and ability to pay; marriage duration; age and health; the marital standard of living and each party's ability to maintain a reasonably comparable one (with neither party entitled to a greater share of it); earning capacities, education, and training; parental responsibilities; time/expense needed to become self-supporting; history of financial and non-financial contributions; the equitable distribution award and its income-producing effect; tax treatment; income available through reasonable investment of distributed assets; and others.
No factor is automatically weighted over another absent written findings explaining why.
But the Appellate Division has repeatedly held a percentage-of-income-differential formula is not a permissible basis for an award. Richmond v. Richmond and Turi v. Turi establish that no fixed formula can substitute for weighing the statutory factors, and unpublished decisions like Eick v. Eick have been remanded where it appeared a trial judge backed into the one-third number instead of addressing the §2A:34-23(b) factors on the record.
Bottom line: use the rule of thumb privately to sanity-check a settlement range if you want — but every number that goes into a CIS, ESP statement, brief, or proposed order has to be tied to the statutory factors, never to "one-third of the difference."
Translation: a NY associate used to running the maintenance guidelines worksheet as a starting point needs to reframe — in NJ there is no worksheet; the starting point is the §2A:34-23(b) factor analysis, informally checked (never cited) against the rule of thumb.
Child support
Both states use guideline-based calculations, but they start from different places — and handle shared parenting time differently.
DRL §240(1-b) / FCA §413: combined parental income is multiplied by a statutory percentage based on the number of children — 17% (1), 25% (2), 29% (3), 31% (4), 35%+ (5 or more).
That total is then allocated between the parents pro rata to their share of combined income.
The formula applies up to a statutory cap on combined income (adjusted every two years for CPI — roughly $183,000–$184,000 in recent years); above the cap, courts may apply the same percentages or weigh the 10 statutory factors.
A Self-Support Reserve protects low-income payors from being pushed below a poverty-linked floor.
The core CSSA formula has no built-in mechanism for shared/equal parenting time — NY courts handle that through case law (e.g., calculating each parent's obligation separately and offsetting).
R. 5:6A / Appendix IX: rather than a flat percentage of one parent's income, the guidelines start from economic data on what an intact household at the parties' combined net income would actually spend on the children, then divide that total between the parents in proportion to each parent's share of combined net income.
Two main worksheets: the Sole Parenting Worksheet, and the Shared Parenting Worksheet — used when the parent of alternate residence has 2+ overnights per week (28%+ of overnights), which adjusts the calculation for that time-sharing directly within the guideline math.
The guidelines are a rebuttable presumption (Appendix IX-A ¶2) — they can be set aside or adjusted for good cause under the Appendix IX-A factors (¶¶4, 7, 10, 13, 14, 15, 20) or where applying them would work an injustice on the facts.
The economic data and worksheets are updated by NJ Supreme Court order roughly annually (most recently effective June 1, 2026).
NJ Court Rules quick links — Part V & appendices
Family practice sits in Part V of the Rules Governing the Courts of the State of New Jersey ("the Family Part"). Start at the main portal, then go straight to the rule or appendix below.
Main portal: njcourts.gov — Rules of Court
Key rules
- R. 5:1Cognizability of actions; case management track assignment (priority / complex / expedited)
- R. 5:3General provisions for family actions — retainer agreements, attorney fees
- R. 5:4Process, pleadings & appearances — the Complaint, Summons, and Answer
- R. 5:5Pretrial procedures — Case Information Statement, Case Management Conference, Early Settlement Panel, post-ESP mediation
- R. 5:6AChild support guidelines (applies Appendix IX)
- R. 5:7Divorce, nullity, separate maintenance
Key appendices
- Appendix VCase Information Statement (CIS) form
- Appendix IX-AConsiderations in the use of the child support guidelines
- Appendix IX-BChild support guideline worksheets & line instructions
Underlying statutes referenced throughout
- N.J.S.A. 2A:34-2Grounds for divorce
- N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23Alimony — and §23.1, equitable distribution factors
- N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 / 9:2-4.1Custody best-interests factors & the DV-conviction custody presumption
Ten more practice differences worth knowing
These come up less often on day one than Sections 2–9, but each one has tripped up an out-of-state practitioner at some point. Treat this as a "watch for it" list rather than a deep dive — follow the citations when one of these actually shows up in a file.
11.1 — Residency requirements to file
Five alternative pathways, any one of which satisfies residency:
- Married in NY, and either spouse has resided in NY for 1 year before filing
- Lived in NY as spouses, and either spouse has resided in NY for 1 year before filing
- The grounds for divorce arose in NY, and either spouse has resided in NY for 1 year before filing
- The grounds arose in NY and both spouses currently reside in NY — no durational minimum
- Otherwise, 2 years' residency by either spouse
Residency must be pleaded and proven as part of the complaint.
Simpler on its face: either spouse must have been a bona fide NJ resident for the 12 consecutive months immediately preceding the filing of the complaint.
The one exception is adultery — if that's the ground, the 12-month requirement is waived entirely (one spouse just needs to be a current NJ resident, and the adultery must have occurred in NJ).
11.2 — College contribution & emancipation
A child is not automatically emancipated at 18. A 2017 statute creates a rebuttable presumption of emancipation at 19, but support can extend to 23 for a full-time student — and college costs are a separate, additional obligation under the 12-factor test from Newburgh v. Arrigo, 88 N.J. 529 (1982): each parent's financial ability, the child's aptitude and commitment, the relationship and communication between parent and child, financial aid availability, and similar factors.
A parent can be ordered to pay child support, contribute to college, both, or — depending on living arrangements and the Newburgh analysis — neither.
Child support terminates by statute at 21 (DRL §240(1-b) / FCA §413).
Courts can order contribution toward college as a discretionary "add-on" expense, but there is no broad, freestanding doctrine comparable to Newburgh that independently obligates a parent to fund higher education based on means, aptitude, and relationship factors.
11.3 — Palimony & cohabitation agreements
NJ has long recognized "palimony" — support owed between unmarried cohabitants based on a promise of support. Since a 2010 amendment, N.J.S.A. 25:1-5(h) (the Statute of Frauds) requires a palimony agreement to be in writing and signed to be enforceable. Maeker v. Ross, 219 N.J. 565 (2014), held this requirement is not retroactive — oral agreements predating January 18, 2010 may still be enforceable. A more recent NJ Supreme Court decision relaxed an earlier independent-counsel requirement, but the writing requirement remains.
NY does not recognize "palimony" as an independent cause of action. Morone v. Morone, 50 N.Y.2d 481 (1980), held that implied contracts based on cohabitation or "housekeeping services" are unenforceable. An express agreement — written or, in principle, oral — between unmarried partners can still be enforced under ordinary contract law, but the broader implied-promise theory NJ once allowed simply doesn't exist in NY.
11.4 — Civil unions & domestic partnerships still exist in NJ
NJ's Civil Union Act (2007) and Domestic Partnership Act (2004) remain on the books. Couples who entered a civil union or domestic partnership before marriage equality (2013) were not automatically converted to married status — those statuses, and the rights/obligations attached to them, persist.
Dissolving a civil union follows divorce-like procedures — same grounds framework, same general rules (R. 5:7 and related) — but it's its own case type, not a divorce. If an intake mentions "we're in a civil union," don't treat it as either a marriage or as nothing.
11.5 — Relocation with a child
Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309 (2017), overruled the longstanding Baures v. Lewis (2001) framework. Previously, a parent of primary residence only had to show a good-faith reason for an out-of-state move that wasn't "inimical" to the child's interests — a relatively low bar. Bisbing now applies the same best-interests analysis as N.J.S.A. 9:2-4 to all contested interstate relocation requests under N.J.S.A. 9:2-2, regardless of whether custody is sole, primary/alternate, or shared.
Because N.J.S.A. 9:2-2 is, by its terms, about removing a child from New Jersey, purely in-state moves are generally handled as ordinary custody-modification applications rather than under this specific statute.
Tropea v. Tropea, 87 N.Y.2d 727 (1996), set out its own enumerated best-interests factors for relocation: each parent's reasons for seeking or opposing the move, the quality of the relationships involved, the impact on the relationship with the non-relocating parent (including the feasibility of alternative visitation), and the degree to which the move would enhance the child's life economically, emotionally, and educationally.
Tropea isn't limited to crossing state lines — a move within New York that would substantially affect an existing custody or visitation arrangement can trigger the same analysis.
11.6 — Where domestic violence orders come from
Final Restraining Orders under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 et seq.) issue exclusively from Superior Court, Family Part — the predicate acts are defined by reference to Title 2C criminal offenses, but the FRO itself is a civil order coming out of the same Family Part that may also be handling a related divorce or custody matter.
An order of protection can issue from any of three places: Family Court (a "family offense" proceeding under FCA Article 8), Criminal Court (as a condition tied to a criminal case), or Supreme Court (as ancillary relief within a pending matrimonial action). More than one of these can potentially be in play for the same underlying conduct.
11.7 — The "uncontested divorce" finish line
Even a fully settled, no-fault (irreconcilable differences) divorce generally still requires a short proof hearing. The plaintiff (often both parties) testifies — frequently by Zoom — that the statutory grounds are met and that the settlement agreement was entered into voluntarily and is fair, before the judge enters the Judgment of Divorce.
The DIY Uncontested Divorce program (available where there are no children under 21 and the ground is §170(7) irretrievable breakdown) is largely paper- and affidavit-based. Many counties don't require any court appearance at all before the Judgment of Divorce is signed.
11.8 — Mandatory parent education program
Under R. 5:8-1, parents of minor children in a contested custody or parenting-time matter must complete an approved Parents' Education Program — many vicinages require it before, or shortly after, the Case Management Conference.
Translation: check this box early in any NJ case involving minor children — it can hold up other relief if it's missed, and it's an easy thing for a NY-trained eye to not even think to look for.
11.9 — Premarital agreements
The Uniform Premarital and Pre-Civil Union Agreement Act (N.J.S.A. 37:2-31 to -41) provides a dedicated statutory framework — including disclosure requirements and the standard for finding an agreement unconscionable.
Governed by general contract principles plus DRL §236B(3): the agreement must be in writing, subscribed by both parties, and acknowledged in the manner required to entitle a deed to be recorded. Unconscionability is generally assessed as of the time of execution, rather than at the time enforcement is sought.
11.10 — Grandparent & third-party visitation
N.J.S.A. 9:2-7.1, as narrowed by Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84 (2003) (applying Troxel v. Granville), requires a grandparent or other third party seeking visitation over a fit parent's objection to show that denying visitation would cause the child particular identifiable harm. A generalized "it would be in the child's best interests" showing isn't enough on its own.
DRL §72 uses a two-step inquiry: first, the grandparent must establish standing (typically through the death of a parent, or "circumstances" showing an existing relationship the grandparent has tried to maintain); second, if standing exists, the court applies an ordinary best-interests analysis — without NJ's "particular identifiable harm" threshold.